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Tax incentives for historic rehabilitation can promote central-city economic development around legacy sites 
that otherwise would go neglected under inexorable and institutionalized suburbanization.  North Carolina has 
had some success with its historic rehabilitation tax credit, but it could learn from other states’ experiences in 
improving this program.
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Her practice focuses primarily on environmental law, including brownfi eld 
redevelopment and adaptive reuse of  mills.  She has particular interest in 
state-wide historic preservation and urban renewal efforts including down-
town revitalizations.
A combination of social and economic forces, as-sisted in no small measure by government poli-
cies and programs, has produced a steady outmigration 
of population and business activity from urban areas, 
regardless of their size.1 Left behind in the “surge to 
the suburbs” is a vast inventory of housing, commercial 
buildings, and, particularly in North Carolina, aban-
doned mills.  A strong argument can be made that in 
an effi cient capital market, uninfl uenced by government 
subsidy, investment would naturally fl ow into the re-
habilitation, reuse, and adaptation of these buildings.2 
Such is not the case, and demographic trends demon-
strate that, for the most part, fl ight to the suburbs con-
tinues, as does continuing destruction of these proper-
ties.  The pattern is well documented, and some North 
Carolina cities and towns resort to annexation as they 
struggle to maintain a viable tax base.
Tax incentives for the rehabilitation of income-produc-
ing historic properties cannot completely reverse demo-
graphic trends or restore fi scal solvency to abandoned 
cities.3 What they can do is provide, at the margin, a use-
ful means to counterbalance the institutionalized policy 
bias toward complete and total suburbanization.  In ad-
dition, there are economic benefi ts of reclaiming these 
buildings and the infrastructure that supports them.  
Estimates vary, but according to Don Rypkema, an ex-
pert urban renewal economist, the numbers are convinc-
ing.  He reports that since 1976, and by the end of 1998, 
developers and business people in North Carolina used 
federal tax incentives for the rehabilitation of desig-
nated historic structures to rehabilitate 733 historic in-
come-producing properties or projects, representing an 
estimated $325 million in private investment.4 Down-
town revitalization in the context of historic preserva-
tion during the same time period has led to 676 busi-
ness expansions, 3,400 new businesses, 1,500 building 
rehabilitations, and (most importantly for the purposes 
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of discussion here) 7,200 new jobs—representing $450 
million in new investment.5 Tourism is the second larg-
est industry in North Carolina, employing 161,000 
people and providing $2.5 billion in annual payroll; the 
number one reported reason tourists visit North Caro-
lina is the state’s historic resources.6 In addition, his-
toric preservation impacts related industries such as the 
crafts industry primarily in Western North Carolina, as 
well as the fi lm industry.7
North Carolina’s Historic Preservation Offi ce (NCH-
PO) reports slightly different numbers.  NCHPO re-
ports that at least 4,162 housing units have been cre-
ated or rehabilitated using the historic tax credit, and 
that many of the units are for low to moderate-income 
families.8   In 1997, the last year before the implementa-
tion of the new North Carolina tax credits, 23 projects 
were complete with rehabilitation expenditures total-
ing $6,062,428. During the last three years (2000-02), 
the annual number of projects has averaged 115 (a 500 
percent increase), with the annual investment averag-
ing $46.9 million (a 774 percent increase).  Since 1976, 
1,088 completed “certifi ed rehabilitation” projects have 
been reviewed by the NCHPO involving $483.3 million 
dollars in construction costs.  NCHPO staff estimate 
that North Carolina’s rehabilitation expenditures on in-
come- and non-income-producing projects have created 
20,000 new full-time jobs, have added $1.06 billion dol-
lars to the state’s economy, and have added $387.1 mil-
lion dollars to the household incomes of North Carolina 
residents. Over 5,000 rental-housing units have been 
created or rehabilitated—many for low- to moderate-in-
come families.  It is critical to note that NCHPO reports 
that developers involved in these rehabilitation projects 
have indicated that the majority of projects completed 
under the income-producing tax credit program would 
not have been completed without it.9 
Another critical benefi t stemming from historic restora-
tion is the cost savings realized by utilizing abandoned 
or under-used infrastructure.  Federal tax incentives 
such as depreciation encourage new construction.  Po-
tential environmental liability issues with older, existing 
sites encourage development on untouched suburban 
greenfi elds.  Substantial government subsidies for ex-
pensive and increased highway construction make trav-
eling to untouched suburban greenfi elds unproblematic. 
As a consequence of the interaction of these and other 
factors, sprawl has become a monolithic problem across 
the nation.  While developers may initially invest in in-
frastructure, cities and counties are left to maintain new 
infrastructure, while existing infrastructure lays idle in 
central cities and business districts.  Such infrastruc-
ture is called a “stranded investment.”10 Companies like 
Carolina Power & Light have huge investments in pow-
erlines and equipment already in place to serve exist-
ing buildings in downtowns and neighborhoods.  When 
those facilities are used at a rate less than their capacity, 
the investment is considered stranded, that is, not able 
to provide a return commensurate to the capital initially 
invested in the equipment.  
Abandoned buildings from a wide array of industries 
sit idle, unused, and draining local economies of tax 
revenue, as new development on the suburban fringe 
requires signifi cant capital investment for new infra-
structure.  Historic areas have infrastructure already in 
place since they are primarily located in close proxim-
ity to travel arteries and central business districts.11  In 
addition to generating revenue through increased job 
creation and promotion of tourism, historic rehabilita-
tion curbs additional infrastructure costs to undeveloped 
greenfi elds, utilizes existing infrastructure, and increas-
es potential future tax revenue from currently idle and 
unproductive properties.
As the economic studies illustrate, historic preservation, 
particularly when combined with the use of historic 
income-producing tax credits, can be a very effi cient 
mechanism to spur North Carolina’s economic growth. 
North Carolina policy makers were on the front end of 
the curve when they adopted the current historic tax 
credit program in 1997.  Several states, including South 
Carolina and Missouri, initially modeled their programs 
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after North Carolina’s program.  North Carolina’s pro-
gram was considered the best, or one of the best, and it 
has had notable success with its program.   Now is an 
ideal time to implement refi nements or targeted incen-
tives that have been implemented elsewhere in order to 
build on this initial success and carry forward the mo-
mentum.
North Carolina has its own particular profi le for reha-
bilitation investment tax credit projects.  North Caro-
lina’s projects tend to be smaller than those occurring 
in other states.12 The type of project is overwhelmingly 
residential, not commercial.  The average estimated 
construction cost is $430,000.  The smallest projects, 
of which there are several, total $6,000 and the larg-
est project, Holly Inn in Pinehurst, totaled more than 
$12.7 million.13  Only a few developers have rehabili-
tated more than one building.  In North Carolina, the 
tax credit program has been largely a program for small 
and moderate business people and investors.  Larger 
projects, however, have been completed in the last few 
years, and the average size is increasing steadily.  Of the 
total rehabilitation projects existing as of December 31, 
1999, 41 percent of the after-rehabilitation uses were 
residential, 35 percent offi ce and commercial, and 24 
percent mixed-use or other uses.14
Most of the rehabilitation investment tax credit activity 
in North Carolina has occurred where historic resources 
are concentrated:  in older settlements on the coast, in 
Piedmont cities, and in early 20th century growth towns 
of the western region.  Despite this concentration, how-
ever, tax credit projects have been located in 69 coun-
ties, distributing the benefi ts across the state. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine possible ini-
tiatives or modifi cation to the current statutory scheme 
that would facilitate more effective use of the state his-
toric rehabilitation income-producing tax credit and 
encourage increased numbers of historic rehabilitation 
projects, thereby positively impacting North Carolina’s 
economy.  It is assumed that the reader is already famil-
iar with the operation of the federal tax credit program.
Overview of North Carolina’s Historic Tax Credit 
Program
North Carolina’s historic tax credit is available to offset 
against North Carolina income tax to taxpayers that are 
allowed a federal income tax credit under the federal 
Code for the Federal tax credit program.15  Like the fed-
eral program, the credit is allowed for qualifi ed reha-
bilitation expenditures for a certifi ed historic structure 
located in North Carolina.  The amount of the credit 
is 20 percent of the expenditures that qualify for the 
federal credit.  The credits are allocated in fi ve equal 
installments beginning with the taxable year in which 
the property is placed in service.16  Any unused credit 
may be carried forward for the succeeding fi ve years 
and the tax may not exceed the amount of taxpayer’s 
North Carolina income tax liability reduced by all other 
credits allowed.
Effective for taxable years since January 1, 1999, a “pass 
through” entity (a limited partnership or limited liability 
company for purposes of discussion here) that qualifi es 
for the credit may allocate it among any of its owners at 
its discretion as long as an owner’s adjusted basis in the 
pass-through entity (as determined under the Code, at 
the end of the taxable year in which the certifi ed historic 
structure is placed in service) is at least 40 percent of 
the amount of credit allocated to that owner.17  There are 
recapture and forfeiture provisions in place to facilitate 
long-term investment in rehabilitation projects.18
North Carolina modeled its historic tax credit program 
after the federal program.  As a result, developers and 
investors have an easier time with extensive paperwork 
and record-keeping requirements for rehabilitation 
projects that meet both the federal and state certifi ca-
tion criteria since the federal and state programs mirror 
each other.19  The opportunity to recoup additional costs 
through the state program for projects that qualify for 
both the federal and state credit provides a signifi cant 
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incentive for both developers and investors.  
In North Carolina, investors and developers can opt to 
disaggregate the federal credits from the state credits. 
Accordingly, a developer may fi nd two separate inves-
tors for a project: a national investor for the federal 
credit and a local investor for the state credit.  A na-
tional investor that does not have signifi cant tax liabil-
ity in North Carolina would probably only be interested 
in the federal credits, leaving the state credits available 
for a local investor.20 Because local investors can invest 
in state credits alone, the structure of the state historic 
credit program, standing apart from the federal scheme, 
can have a signifi cant impact on the type, amount, and 
size of historic rehabilitation projects. 
As stated previously, the primary purpose of this paper 
is to examine possible initiatives or changes in the cur-
rent statutory scheme that would facilitate greater and 
more effective utilization of the state credit program 
and encourage increased numbers of historic rehabilita-
tion projects.  In order to effectively analyze possible 
changes in the current scheme, it is important to un-
derstand how these deals are structured, since there is 
technically no market exchange in place. 
Primary Investors and the Structure of a Historic 
Rehabilitation Tax Credit Deal21
In order to understand why historic rehabilitation tax 
credit deals are structured as they are, it is important 
to fi rst acknowledge the impact certain tax code provi-
sions have on taxpayers that could serve as potential in-
vestors in these deals.22 For example, the historic reha-
bilitation credit cannot be used to reduce liability for the 
alternative minimum tax; it is also subject to the passive 
activity loss prevention rules of Section 469 of the Code 
and the at-risk rules of Section 49 of the Code.
The alternative minimum tax (“AMT”) is an additional 
tax over and above regular income tax.23 The idea un-
derlying the AMT is to prevent taxpayers from avoiding 
tax liability by using special tax benefi ts, tax shelters, 
or tax credits.  The AMT rules determine the minimum 
amount of tax that a taxpayer within a certain income 
bracket should be required to pay.  Many of the credits 
that are allowed when calculating regular income tax, 
such as historic tax credits, are not allowed when cal-
culating AMT.  The more credits claimed for regular 
income tax, the more likely it is that AMT payment will 
be required.  
At-risk limitations limit an investor’s deductions to the 
amount at-risk—that is, money an investor stands to 
lose should an investment turn sour.24  The initial sum 
considered at risk is the amount of cash and the adjust-
ed basis of property contributed to the activity and/or 
amounts borrowed for which an investor is personally 
liable.  An investor may not claim deductions for losses 
greater than these amounts invested.
The passive activity loss rules force an investor to segre-
gate all income and losses into three categories: active, 
passive and portfolio.25 Generally, these rules disallow 
deducting passive losses against active or portfolio in-
come, even when an investor is at risk to the extent of 
the loss.  Deductions for passive activity or related ex-
penses may be claimed only to the extent that they off-
set income from all passive activities.  
In order to avoid the passive activity loss rule and to 
claim any investment losses against active income, an 
investor must have “material participation” in an en-
deavor.  Material participants must participate on a con-
tinuous and substantial basis.  The material participation 
standard is diffi cult to determine, and the IRS provides 
several tests to help taxpayers determine their current 
participation levels.26  
Therefore, when stepping back to consider the Code 
provisions combined, in order for an investor in a his-
toric rehabilitation tax credit deal to successfully use 
the credits, the investor must fi rst meet a minimum tax 
threshold (after application of any credits), and then 
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may deduct only up to the amount directly at risk, pro-
vided the investor participates in the deal materially, 
not just passively.  It is a rather tall order and restricts 
who can effectively claim the credit.27 Accordingly, in 
North Carolina, a typical investor is a major corporate 
entity, although, in some cases, investors may be syndi-
cated funds.  Current purchasers of historic rehabilita-
tion credit transactions are primarily fi nancial services 
companies, particularly banks.  
Usually, the on-the-ground developer of a historic proj-
ect wants to utilize the historic rehabilitation credit as 
a source of fi nancing for the project.28 In order to do 
this, the developer would want to sell the credit to an 
outside investor while simultaneously retaining all of 
the economic benefi ts from the project.  To accomplish 
this within the restrictions of the tax code and historic 
tax credit programs, the entity that has evolved for own-
ership of buildings eligible for the credit is either the 
limited partnership (LP) or the limited liability com-
pany (LLC) (hereinafter “partnership”).  The changes 
recommended here are based in part on the structure of 
these deals and the allocation of profi ts and tax credits 
in these entities.
Comparative Analysis: Strategies Used in Other 
States that Promote Redevelopment
North Carolina has typically been on the forefront of 
innovative policy initiatives encouraging develop-
ment.  North Carolina policy-makers led the pack in 
1997 when they enacted the current historic tax cred-
it program.  One of the ways to assess the effective-
ness of North Carolina’s current tax credit program is 
to examine programs offered in other states.  Such a 
comparative analysis offers differing perspectives as 
well as benchmarks to measure adequacy and areas for 
improvement.  The analysis here will assume rational 
market actors who wish primarily to maximize profi t. 
The further assumptions are: 1) the less the risk, 2) the 
easier it is to turn a property, and 3) the easier it is to en-
ter and exit a deal, then the greater the program’s over-
all effectiveness and effi ciency in reaching the goal of 
promoting redevelopment.
A comprehensive survey using several sources revealed 
that 22 states have programs designed to encourage 
historic preservation and redevelopment of older aban-
doned properties that do not involve state income tax 
credits, but instead involve property tax abatements.29 
Of the remaining 28 states, 10 do not have any type of 
fi nancial or tax incentive for historic rehabilitation at 
all.30  Of the remaining 18 states, 7 use some combina-
tion of property tax abatement and tax credit, and the 
remaining 11 states use some form of tax credit stand-
ing alone.  The following analysis will focus on differ-
ing aspects of those 18 states that utilize some form of 
tax credit.31 The purpose is not to exhaustively compare 
those 18 states’ programs, but to select statutory pro-
visions from among them that promote redevelopment, 
and to utilize economic data from those states where 
available.  Greater focus is placed on southeastern states 
since North Carolina competes with southeastern states 
to attract business as well as tourism revenue.32
States use varying strategies to promote redevelopment 
of historic properties and several factors infl uence how 
policy makers develop a program.  As expected, the 
greater the positive economic impact that can be shown, 
as well as the greater number of historic resources within 
a state, the more willing policy-makers will be not only 
to support a tax credit program, but also to strengthen it 
once it is clear that the program is successful and effec-
tuating policy goals.  Indeed, North Carolina’s historic 
tax credit program has positively impacted the state’s 
economy.  The critical inquiry for policy makers now is 
how best to build upon the successful foundation of the 
program to strengthen it and generate even more rev-
enue for the state.  The following fi ve provisions are ele-
ments of statutory schemes from other states that North 
Carolina’s policy makers should consider implementing 
for the reasons given.
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1)  Allow developers to realize the entire historic tax 
credit in the year the structure is placed in service
In North Carolina, the current tax credit program re-
stricts a developer to apply for historic tax credits in 
equal installments over a fi ve-year period once the 
building is placed in service.33 Investors must then 
also wait for the credit to pass through.  As a result of 
the fi ve-year restriction, developers in North Carolina 
wishing to fi nance a project can only obtain $0.50 on 
the dollar for each tax dollar of credit.34
North Carolina’s fi ve-year restriction is very unusual. 
Other states do not provide for a credit realization time 
restriction but rather allow the entire credit to be claimed 
either the year the building is placed in service or as the 
rehabilitation is carried out.35  In Virginia, for example, 
the entire tax credit may all be applied in the year the 
building is placed in service.36  As a result, developers 
in Virginia receive $0.65 on the dollar for each tax dol-
lar of credit because investors can use the credits im-
mediately.37 The time-value of money comes into play 
and Virginia’s higher price refl ects the value investors 
receive from the ability to use the credit immediately.38 
The fact that Virginia does not place a time restriction 
on when the credits may be claimed puts North Caro-
lina at a competitive disadvantage.  
National investors with substantial tax liability in both 
North Carolina and Virginia, if forced to select only one 
market for investment, would likely choose to invest 
in Virginia projects in order to receive the greater im-
mediate tax benefi t.  In addition, developers in Virginia 
would likely be willing to undertake larger scale proj-
ects or take on riskier properties because they can se-
cure greater up-front fi nancing.  The evidence indicates 
that North Carolina’s historic rehabilitation projects 
are smaller than those in other states, and the timing of 
credit realization is part of the reason why.  Eliminating 
the restriction would bring North Carolina into align-
ment with a majority of other states.
2)  Allow investors to use the historic rehabilitation 
credit to offset against other signifi cant taxes in lieu 
of state income tax
Some companies and certain types of business entities 
do not pay state income tax, per se.  Instead, they pay 
some other form of tax.  For example, premium tax is 
the tax that insurance companies pay for the premiums 
they receive.  Insurance companies are not subject to 
franchise or income taxes once the premium tax is levied 
against them.39  But North Carolina’s historic tax credit 
is restricted to state income tax.40 Insurance companies 
have enormous state tax liability in North Carolina, but 
the liability is premium tax, not income tax, so they are 
precluded from investing in historic tax credits.  
While an investor can always offset federal tax liability, 
the appeal of investing in a rehabilitation project with-
in North Carolina is greater for companies that have 
North Carolina tax liability.  Currently in North Caro-
lina, banks are the primary investors in historic reha-
bilitation credits because they have enough of the “right 
kind” of North Carolina tax liability to make investing 
worthwhile.  Bank of America and the Community Af-
fordable Housing Equity Corporation (CAHEC) are the 
primary investors in historic rehabilitation credit proj-
ects in North Carolina.  Bank of America has enormous 
tax liability and passive income from its Charlotte head-
quarters.  CAHEC is a non-profi t corporation that spe-
cializes in organizing and managing low-income hous-
ing tax credit equity funds, and it has a historic credit 
program.41 BB&T and Wachovia have limited state tax 
liability and rarely invest in these deals.  Thus, the uni-
verse of potential investors is small.
Unlike the situation with the fi ve-year credit timing al-
location, North Carolina is not in the minority as to the 
income tax restriction for offset purposes; many states 
allow offsets only for personal or corporate state income 
tax.42 Several states with highly successful programs, 
however, allow historic credits to offset several other 
forms of tax in addition to state income tax.  By allow-
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ing offsets to various forms of income from various 
types of industries, states open up entirely new markets 
of potential investors in rehabilitation projects.  Devel-
opers in North Carolina experience diffi culty in fi nding 
investors for projects because the current market is so 
restricted.  By allowing credit offsets against one or two 
additional forms of tax liability, North Carolina policy-
makers would open North Carolina’s market consider-
ably and put North Carolina in a competitive position 
for attracting private investment.  
Virginia, North Carolina’s economic competitor to the 
north, provides an exemplary model that promotes not 
only historic rehabilitation, but also business in general. 
Investors in Virginia’s tax credits are not restricted to 
state income tax liability.43  Investors may apply the 
credit against not only individual income tax,44 but 
also against estate and trust tax,45 corporate tax,46 bank 
franchise tax,47 insurance company tax (like a premium 
tax),48 and any licensing taxes for telegraph, telephone, 
water, heat, light, power or pipeline companies.49 Such 
a scheme allows companies with enormous state tax li-
ability in various forms, like insurance companies and 
utility companies, to partner in historic rehabilitation 
deals.
Several states in addition to Virginia provide investors 
the option to offset against other taxes.  For example, 
Rhode Island allows offsets against personal income 
tax,50 business corporate tax,51 franchise tax,52 public 
service corporation tax,53 bank tax,54 and insurance 
company tax.55  Missouri offers offsets against income 
tax for individuals, corporations, partnerships, estates 
and trusts,56 as well as taxes of fi nancial institutions in-
cluding banks, credit unions, savings and loans, insur-
ance companies, and farmers’ cooperative credit asso-
ciations. 57
It becomes apparent at once that the pool of potential 
investors in historic rehabilitation projects in states 
like Virginia, Rhode Island, and Missouri far exceeds 
those in North Carolina.  In order to increase the pool 
of potential investors, North Carolina policy makers can 
simply include additional forms of tax liability in the 
current statute.
Some may become concerned that these credits deplete 
the state’s treasury in a time when the state budget is 
already in bad shape, and allowing additional investors 
will deplete the treasury even further.58  However, dou-
ble dipping is not allowed under any state scheme; only 
one person, household, or entity may claim a historic 
tax credit.  By allowing additional investors to enter the 
market, policy-makers will lay the foundation for more 
historic rehabilitation projects, which has been shown 
to increase revenue and jobs. 
In the short-term, some may predict that state revenues 
will drop if North Carolina allows additional industries 
to capitalize on the credits.  While a credit is a credit, 
regardless of who claims it, opening the market will 
pave the way for increased use of credits in amounts not 
currently contemplated.  Evidence consistently shows, 
however, that the tax revenue generated from the reuse 
of once unproductive property far outweighs any short-
term revenue losses.59   
Policy-makers in Missouri had such a concern, and the 
St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association 
commissioned a study of the short-term and long-term 
economic impact of historic preservation.  The study 
showed that the historic tax credit program generated 
$1.78 for every $1.00 of tax credit issued.60  More-
over, the study found that developers must raise $4.00 
in private equity fi nancing for each $1.00 of tax credit 
issued.61  Researchers also noted that short-term losses 
are virtually irrelevant because the equity and fi nanc-
ing must be raised and the rehabilitation of the property 
complete before a single credit is issued.62  Essentially, 
the building begins generating tax revenue once it is 
placed in service, and only when it is placed in service 
may a developer apply for the credits, thereby minimiz-
ing state revenue losses from issuing the credits.   
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While there is no published cost-benefi t data on the 
North Carolina historic tax credit program, the feder-
al program may prove a useful parallel for illustrative 
purposes.  In fi scal year 1995, there were 529 historic 
rehabilitation projects representing investment of $467 
million.63  The cost to the federal treasury was $93.4 
million.64  Yet the increased revenue totaled $124.25 
million—signifi cantly more than the revenue cost.65 
North Carolina’s credit program is modeled closely 
after the federal credit program, so it is reasonable to 
assume a similar ratio or percentage of return.  By al-
lowing offsets to additional forms of tax liability, policy 
makers will strategically position North Carolina’s pro-
gram among the elite, encouraging business investment 
that the state might not otherwise realize.  
Also important to this discussion is the idea of cost and 
benefi t allocation.  Many argue that these types of pro-
grams have costs that exceed benefi ts.  Those that op-
pose these programs argue that economic analyses are 
fl awed because they weigh assumptions too heavily to 
accurately predict revenue or economic impacts.  As-
suming arguendo that such is the case, there is still a 
strong argument for promoting these programs because 
of the benefi t allocation.  
In the example of the federal tax credit program, the 
federal government foregoes certain tax revenue in or-
der to promote redevelopment.  That redevelopment in 
turn directly benefi ts both state and local governments 
through increased local property tax revenue.  Whether 
the federal government acts for the precise purpose of 
enriching state and local government is questionable 
but nevertheless irrelevant.  The fact remains that state 
and local governments receive revenue from properties 
put back into service and on the tax roles as a result 
of the federal credit.  Such is also the case with a state 
credit.  A state will temporarily forego revenue in the 
short term while local governments benefi t almost im-
mediately from economic stimulation in a once eco-
nomically stagnant area.
Policy-makers should consider allowing offsets against 
other forms of income to diversify the historic tax credit 
investor base in order to stimulate and increase state and 
local tax revenue.
3) Eliminate or shorten the credit recapture period
Recapture provisions generally anticipate and are trig-
gered by very different scenarios.  For example, failure 
or closure of a property within fi ve years of receiving a 
credit will trigger the recapture provisions.  Modifi ca-
tions to a property that do not comply with the historic 
rehabilitation standards set by the Department of the In-
terior (“Interior”) will also trigger recapture provisions 
if the non-complying modifi cations occur within fi ve 
years of receiving a credit.  Finally, sale of a property 
or sale of a certain percentage of interest in a property 
triggers recapture as well.  
Recapture provisions can provide an effi cient mecha-
nism for risk allocation.  On one hand, recapture provi-
sions can promote more careful selection of projects in 
terms of market strength, since loss of tenants can lead 
to project failure, resulting in a loss of credits.  Under 
such a scenario, the developer carries the risk of proj-
ect failure and society is not left with a string of failed, 
abandoned projects and only a lack of revenue to show 
for it.  On the other hand, developers currently cannot 
sell redeveloped projects because sale or transfer of a 
rehabilitated property during the fi ve-year period after it 
is placed in service and the credits are claimed qualifi es 
for recapture.  In addition, developers currently carry an 
additional risk in the way the deals are structured.
Because investors in historic rehabilitation projects ac-
quire interests in partnerships to obtain the historic re-
habilitation credits, investors, as opposed to developers, 
are not concerned with receiving signifi cant cash fl ow 
from a project.66  An investor’s principal concern is that 
projects remain viable for a period of at least fi ve years 
in order to avoid recapture.  Accordingly, a typical in-
vestor requires both a credit guaranty and a guaranty of 
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operating expenses for the project.  
Eliminating, shortening, or modifying the recapture 
period would greatly reduce risk for investors, thereby 
making it easier for developers to obtain capital invest-
ment.  It would also reduce a developer’s personal risk 
in guaranty agreements.  With reference to the assump-
tions outlined previously, the easier it is to enter and 
exit a deal, the easier it is to obtain credit, and the easier 
it is to turn a property, the more successful the reinvest-
ment will be. 
There is a split among the states regarding recapture 
with a majority including it.  For example, New Mexico, 
Virginia, Missouri, Kansas, and Rhode Island, to name 
a few, do not include a recapture provision as part of 
their programs.67 Colorado, Indiana, Michigan, Maine, 
and Vermont, however, all incorporate some form of 
the federal fi ve-year recapture provision.  Those states 
that include a recapture provision do not distinguish be-
tween scenarios triggering recapture, such as sale ver-
sus failure, when determining whether a developer is 
subject to recapture of credits.
As a general rule, property law and economics do not 
favor excessive restraints on sale and transfer of prop-
erty.  Neither do developers.  Allowing developers to 
turn property easily and quickly frees up capital and 
enables them to delve into subsequent projects.  Elimi-
nating recapture gives developers greater fl exibility in 
determining when to divest from a partnership after a 
completed rehabilitation.  There is no evidence of abuse 
in those states that do not have a recapture provision. 
There is also no evidence that avoiding a recapture pro-
vision somehow encourages rehabilitated buildings to 
later be modifi ed in unacceptable ways or shortens a 
rehabilitated building’s useful life.  It seems that once 
buildings are put back into productive use, they con-
tinue to be productive.68
Recapture provisions also affect the value of the tax 
credit.  The difference in price between the federal 
credit and the state credit occurs because state taxes are 
deductible for federal tax purposes.  Assuming the in-
vestor is in the 35 percent bracket, the tax credit at par 
is worth $0.65.  The NC credit is worth $0.50 for two 
reasons.  The fi rst reason involves the fi ve-year credit 
claim restriction, as discussed previously.  The other 
key reason is that a recapture provision serves as a fi ve-
year holding period.  Investors often hold the credits 
until the credits vest and are free from the possibility of 
recapture.  Once again, the time value of money dictates 
that the longer an investor is required to wait to claim 
a credit, the less the credit is worth to that investor in 
terms of current dollar value.  
North Carolina would encourage greater private invest-
ment and accelerate the productive reuse of numbers of 
blighted buildings by shortening, modifying, or elimi-
nating the fi ve-year recapture provision.  For example, 
policy-makers could limit the scenarios that trigger 
recapture to situations where a project fails or where 
a developer made modifi cations that did not meet the 
standards set by Interior and, at the same time, eliminate 
recapture for transfer or sale of property.  Under such 
a framework, developers still shoulder the majority of 
risk, but they have greater fl exibility to sell a project 
than they do presently. In another modifi cation exam-
ple, policy-makers could reduce the recapture provision 
to three years, thereby maintaining the current risk allo-
cation scheme, with developers shouldering the major-
ity of risk, but reducing the risk slightly.  Reducing the 
recapture period would also increase the current value 
of the tax credit.
The point is not to eliminate risk for developers or to 
shift the inherent risk completely to society, but rath-
er to even the scales a bit to encourage development 
where it is not otherwise occurring.  Policy-makers can 
be creative in crafting a recapture provision in order to 
maintain an acceptable risk allocation between society 
and developers.  Shortening, modifying or eliminating 
the recapture provision is yet another tool available to 
strengthen the current historic tax credit program.
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4)  Create a market for historic rehabilitation credits 
and make them fully transferable
Rhode Island, Missouri, and Delaware lead the way as 
far as free market transferability of credits.69   They each 
permit taxpayers eligible for historic tax credits to as-
sign, transfer, or convey the credits, in whole or in part, 
by sale or otherwise to any individual or entity.  The 
assignee then steps into the shoes of the original tax-
payer and acquires the same offset rights; assignees are 
not limited in any way by the mere fact that they are 
assignees.
  
There are several benefi ts to adopting such a scheme.  To 
begin, the greatest benefi t would be that the structure of 
historic rehabilitation deals would change.  Developers 
could develop a project without needing to partner with 
another institution to claim the state credit.  Because 
the credits would be transferable in whole or in part, 
developers could sell the credits in smaller blocks to 
smaller investors who do not have enormous tax liabil-
ity.  In the alternative, a large investor, such as Bank of 
America, could sell smaller blocks of credits to smaller 
taxpayers.  Investors would not be precluded from in-
vesting in these types of projects because of tax liabil-
ity limits.  In addition, because developers would have 
greater fl exibility as to how to allocate credits, they may 
consider larger rehabilitation projects that at one time 
would have been out of reach due to the large burden of 
risk on a single investor.
Adopting such a transferability scheme in addition to 
some of the other recommendations would make North 
Carolina’s historic rehabilitation tax credit program one 
of the most competitive in the nation.  For example, 
combing transferability with immediate realization and 
no recapture provisions would allow developers to un-
dertake larger, previously riskier projects and would at-
tract a variety of small to medium size investors that had 
previously been excluded from the investment process. 
Businesses would be drawn to invest in these programs, 
creating a positive cash fl ow for the state stemming 
from new tax revenue from rehabilitated buildings.   
5) Provide targeted incentives for abandoned mills
North Carolina has a vast number of abandoned mills—
mills that were once the heart of the now defunct North 
American textile industry.  Almost every small town in 
North Carolina, and elsewhere in the South, had at least 
one cotton mill.70  Most are now abandoned and dilapi-
dated.  Two hundred and thirty six mills closed in North 
Carolina between 1997 and 2002.  While some are be-
ing put to alternative uses such as museums and concert 
halls, many are being destroyed, or their building ma-
terials sold off at premium prices.71  These mills repre-
sent the heritage of North Carolina, and many serve as a 
town’s central architectural feature.  
As discussed previously, but for the many governmental 
policies encouraging development elsewhere, private 
development would focus on reuse of these buildings 
and their supporting infrastructure.  Policy-makers can 
use the historic tax credit as an effective means to target 
abandoned mills and promote their redevelopment and 
reuse.  The current historic tax credit program does not 
target any one particular historic resource.  If policy- 
makers want to target mill redevelopment, the low-in-
come housing tax credit could serve as a good model for 
how to modify the historic tax credit to target mills.  
Section 42 of the Code outlines the low income hous-
ing tax credit.72  Congress allocated special provisions 
for determining eligible basis in an attempt to provide 
incentives to target certain areas.  Developers using the 
low-income housing tax credit are eligible for a 130 per-
cent increase in eligible basis of a qualifying property 
provided that the building is located in either a qualifi ed 
census tract (an area with a high concentration of low- 
income residents) or in a diffi cult to develop area (an 
area where development costs are exceptionally high).73 
By providing a 30 percent booster to basis in diffi cult 
to develop areas, Congress encourages development of 
low-income housing where it would otherwise never 
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occur.
Many policy-makers are already familiar with the low-
income housing tax credit structure.  Application by 
analogy to the historic tax credit program would not be 
diffi cult.  For example, North Carolina could provide a 
30 percent (or some other percentage) boost in eligible 
basis for the redevelopment of historic textile mills. 
Such an incentive would direct commercial develop-
ment to these particular resources.  The potential eco-
nomic benefi ts of such a program would be widespread 
and would impact most small towns across the state, 
since mills are not concentrated in one area of the state. 
However, if applied as suggested, this approach would 
be complicated to implement because the basis deter-
mination would differ for federal and state tax credit 
programs.
Another simpler approach might be to increase the state 
income-producing credit from its current 20 percent of 
qualifi ed expenditures for historic properties in general 
to 40 percent for adaptive redevelopment of mills.  Such 
a change to the current scheme would create a greater 
incentive for private developers to specifi cally target 
abandoned mills.  Moreover, for ease of use, the opera-
tional approach to claiming the credits would remain 
the same as is currently utilized. 
One of the major economic challenges facing North 
Carolina is the growing economic disparity between 
rural and urban areas.74  While North Carolina’s major 
cities continue to experience an economic boom that 
bring high-paying jobs and a range of social and cultur-
al amenities, most rural areas are in a state of economic 
stagnation or decline.75  Rural economic development 
in North Carolina is a critical goal, and since most small 
towns have at least one mill, targeting mills for reuse 
likely would provide an economic boost to rural areas. 
A mill incentive would provide an equitable distribution 
of tax incentives and would not result in a concentration 
of rehabilitation only in larger cities.76
Conclusion
Sprawl is on the rise.  New construction continues at a 
staggering pace.  Government policies encourage new 
construction on the suburban fringe and central cities are 
left depleted of tax revenue, supporting vast idle and un-
der-used infrastructure.  Historic resources are ignored, 
abandoned, and usually destroyed.  While the numbers 
vary, economists have shown that historic preservation 
creates jobs, attracts tourists, increases governmental 
revenue, and brings in private investment at a 4:1 ratio. 
Policy-makers across the nation have awakened to the 
possibilities historic preservation may offer for curbing 
sprawl, maximizing stranded infrastructure investments, 
and promoting and maintaining livable, attractive cities 
and towns for both residents and tourists.  
While North Carolina currently offers a historic reha-
bilitation tax credit that has received use, the tax credit 
can be stronger and can be structured to attract greater 
investment.  Virginia is one of North Carolina’s primary 
economic competitors and has a program that attracts 
greater private investment.  Rhode Island and Missouri 
also have model programs that promote business and 
encourage private investment by making it easier for 
developers to solicit investors to rehabilitate historic 
properties.  Some of those strategies could be employed 
in North Carolina to make its program more competi-
tive today and encourage greater reinvestment.
The suggestions put forth are not intended to be used 
carte blanche.  Doing so would shift the allocation of 
risk completely and unacceptably from developers to 
society.  In fact, it would be unwise to adopt all sug-
gestions together.  Adopting all suggestions would not 
ensure the outcome espoused at the outset of this dis-
cussion, which is to promote greater historic rehabili-
tation as an effective and effi cient economic develop-
ment tool.  While adopting all measures would promote 
greater historic rehabilitation, it also could encourage 
potential abuse, which would, in turn, likely drain the 
economy, creating an ineffi cient outcome.  State and lo-
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cal governments would forego revenue and likely have 
little to show in terms of percentage of overall success. 
Such a scenario does not serve the public interest.
Instead, the provisions outlined are meant to serve as 
benchmarks for ideas that could be incorporated selec-
tively or partially.  The adoption of just two or three sug-
gestions would signifi cantly alter the historic tax credit 
program as it currently stands and promote greater re-
development without simultaneously shifting risk.  Al-
lowing the credit to offset against a wider array of taxes 
than just income tax is a highly recommended change, 
regardless of the other measures adopted.  For example, 
increasing the amount of credit allowed for mill rede-
velopment and a transferability provision would likely 
revolutionize the projects undertaken throughout the 
state without shifting unreasonable risk to state and lo-
cal governments.  
Incorporation of some variety of these changes would 
benefi t historic rehabilitation developers as well.  De-
velopers currently familiar with the system and in-
volved in historic rehabilitation projects will likely ex-
pand their rehabilitation activities.  As discussed earlier, 
North Carolina’s projects tend to be smaller than those 
in other states.  Developers may be willing to approach 
larger projects that they would have avoided otherwise. 
In addition, the greatest amount of rehabilitation has 
been residential.  Modifying the program will shift the 
focus and encourage greater commercial redevelop-
ment, which is at the heart of economic development. 
In the process, developers will receive tax benefi ts, but 
more importantly, they will be able to solicit a diverse 
pool of investors that bring needed private investment 
to the table.  Developers who at one time were not inter-
ested in the historic rehabilitation market may become 
so, once risk is hedged and return marginally increased. 
Historic rehabilitation tax credit deals are sophisticated 
and highly risky; any changes that can be adopted to 
make deals easier and somewhat safer will further open 
the market.
It is time for North Carolina’s policy makers to consider 
strengthening the historic tax credit program.  Policy 
makers should study the effectiveness of historic reha-
bilitation tax credit programs in other states that have 
model programs, such as Virginia, Missouri, and Rhode 
Island.  A close look at other states will reveal the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of incorporating the various 
modifi cations suggested here.  These suggested modifi -
cations could be used individually or in tandem.  The 
more they are strategically and thoughtfully combined 
together, however, the stronger and more competitive 
North Carolina’s historic tax credit program will be. 
The stronger the program, the greater the private invest-
ment will be.  The greater the private investment, the 
greater the economic benefi t to the state and local gov-
ernments and their residents.  
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